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This was the fifth UK General Election campaign at which the Internet has played a 
part, and given the proliferation in social media use since 2010 many commentators 
expected it to play a key role, and yes, some predicted it would be the first social 
media election (e.g. BBC, 2015; Channel 4, 2015). But whereas in previous elections 
such claims may have been comfortably dismissed as hype, we might argue that 
there was some substance to them this time around. There are at least two reasons 
for this. Firstly, because of the sheer reach of social media, with well over half of the 
UK population using social media in 2015, compared to 34% in 2010 (Channel 4, 
2015). Social media now matches TV when it comes to consuming news, and has 
risen considerably in reach since 2010 (Newman, Levy and Nielsen, 2015). The 
2015 Reuters Institute Digital News Report showed that half (49%) of under-35s use 
social networks like Facebook and Twitter to access political news compared with 
around a quarter (26%) four years ago (Newman, Levy and Nielsen, 2015). 
Furthermore, Newman (2015) argues that “the web itself has changed fundamentally 
over the last five years – with a new emphasis on mobile, social and visual media”. 
Here, the ubiquity of smartphones and tablets has made them the primary gateway 
for information and news about politics in 2015 for many people, with reportedly 
more than half of traffic to online election stories from such devices (Newman, 2015). 
Equally significant is the growth in social discovery, where users are accidentally 
exposed to political content through their social media feeds and networks. Of 
course, much of the content which circulates on social media maybe remediated 
from major news outlets, the big news brands, but this also makes social media 
news feeds a battleground for NGOs, pressure groups and, of course, political 
parties.  
Another reason for taking social media seriously as a key election battleground in 
2015 was the money being spent on it. If following the money is a good barometer of 
the perceived effectiveness of a campaigning tool, then 2015 was a breakthrough 
year for Facebook. With comfortably the biggest campaign budget, the Conservative 
Party led the way here, reportedly spending £100,000 a month on Facebook ads by 
February 2015 and considerably more during the campaign itself. The bulk of this 
money was being spent on collecting vast amounts of voter data - particularly in the 
key marginals - and then delivering micro targeted Facebook ads to target voters 
(see Anstead, 2015). In this sense, micro-targeting is entirely in line with what the 
major parties have increasingly been doing in recent elections through huge 
canvassing databases such as Mosaic (Fisher et al, 2011). It is about spending 
money on delivering targeted messages - delivered over phone, leaflet and 
increasingly in 2015, Facebook. 
In this sense, it should therefore be apparent that considering social media in 
isolation of other media is increasingly misplaced. From a campaign perspective, 
social media is now deeply integrated into party campaign strategy. This is because 
election campaigns are highly professionalized and strategic in their design and 
execution. In practice, the professionalization of election campaigning sees parties 
using the entire hypermedia environment, mainstream news outlets, social media as 
well as face to face forms of communication.  
While hypermedia campaigning (Howard, 2006) and the exploitation of every 
medium and communication technology explains campaign communication strategy, 
the strategic design of a party election campaign draws heavily on lessons from the 
world of corporate marketing (Lilleker et al, 2006). Key policy promises, key 
campaign messages and the design of communication as well as the selection of a 
medium is tailored to maximise the impact on potential supporters (Lilleker, 2013). 
Whilst we may see contemporary election campaigning as highly strategic and 
professionalised, does this mean that it is engaging, mobilising or even inspiring? In 
this chapter we explore the use of social media, alongside other ‘mundane’ internet 
tools such as email, by UK political parties for campaigning purposes during the 
2015 general election. With particular focus on mobilisation and persuasion, we 
examine some of the continuities and changes that 2015 brought compared to 
previous elections in terms of the online campaign.  
Firstly, we document party attempts at gamification and micro rewards as a means of 
mobilizing supporters, including how the parties emulated campaigning groups such 
as Avaaz and 38 degrees in terms of fundraising through email. Then we examine 
how the parties used social media in 2015 to mobilise and persuade. Here, we ask to 
what extent do parties exploit social media through posting and responding to the 
comments of their followers? Do parties gain a significant following, and what kinds 
of followers emerge in terms of their behaviours? Then, what links can we make 
between online voice share and electoral success? 
Our chapter reports data from two sources. Firstly, data on social media use by 
parties and the stratification of user behaviour was provided by SoTrender, a data 
gathering and analysis company. The data reported covers the six week period of 
the UK election campaign, including election day itself, 26th March 2015 to 7th May 
2015. The data records the number of items posted by the political parties and the 
number of shares, likes and comments each item earned. As such, our focus in this 
chapter is the online activities of the parties, not candidates.  
The second data source is a specially commissioned survey performed by Opinium 
research during March 2015 which asked respondents about their online and offline 
political participation, including social media based activism as well as the forces of 
mobilization. The survey, to a representative sample of the UK population, gained 
2037 valid responses. The Opinium survey data is used to explain the links between 
forms of participation, and the extent that parties and other political organisations 
mobilise their supporters to undertake both offline and online forms of participation. 
Campaigning online: the journey to 2015 
Whilst election campaigns in the UK have become increasingly sophisticated, 
strategic and professionalized in the last 30 years, when it comes to the adoption of 
digital technologies, UK parties have been relatively slow to innovate. While simple 
websites appeared for the 1997 election, these were populated with shovelware – 
essentially, content created for offline campaign materials such as leaflets – which 
was reconfigured for online distribution. The evolution of the political party websites, 
from huge spaces with an archive of press releases and information to lean 
campaign-oriented machines, took considerable time (Lilleker et al, 2015). Similarly 
parties’ adoption of mechanisms to encourage greater engagement and interaction 
was a slow and halting process. E-newsletters, for example, were widely used by 
parties but were criticised for being simply informational and offering no means for 
feedback (Jackson & Lilleker, 2007). As parties have adopted social media it was 
suggested that even up to the last election, they occupied a space between the 
informational web, Web 1.0, and the interactive web, Web 2.0 (Lilleker & Jackson, 
2011). The party space of Web 1.5 sees the utilisation of social media platforms, with 
many options open to their followers and visitors to interact with one another and, 
theoretically, the party. But parties invariably eschew interacting themselves and 
largely invite visitors to donate or sign-up rather than involving them in the campaign 
(ibid.). 
The campaign of Barack Obama in 2008 demonstrated the value of a more relational 
approach and had some impact on the conduct of campaigns in the UK in 2010 
(Lilleker & Jackson, 2011). Here, the three major parties, Conservatives, Labour and 
Liberal Democrats, each created an intraparty space for supporters to connect with 
one another and become involved in small tasks related to the campaign, though 
these remained geared more towards donating than campaigning. These 
developments gave some hint that campaigns might become more inclusive and 
interactive, though they did not have the same impact as that of Obama. The Obama 
campaigns, building on developments within the Democrat Party (Kreiss, 2012) and 
broader progressive movement in America (Karpf, 2012), sought to empower online 
political activists and channel their activism into supporting his campaign. Analysed 
from a relationship marketing approach this involved converting those whose interest 
was piqued into firstly latent and then connected supporters, bringing them into the 
Obama social network, and then encouraging them to be brand advocates and then 
active campaigners (Lilleker & Jackson, 2013). 
The broader trend here lies in the shift in repertoires of political participation amongst 
citizens witnessed in many western democracies. Broadly speaking, it is driven by 
partisan dealignment (see Evans, 2003) and disengagement from electoral politics 
(Hay, 2007). In practice these processes have led to a move away from ‘traditional’ 
forms of participation such as attending political meetings, election canvassing or 
writing to one’s MP towards more non-conventional forms of participation such as 
signing an online petition, boycotting certain brands, or sharing a political story on 
social media (Bennett, 2014). Whilst this shift in participation predates social media, 
the affordances of digital technologies are permitting shallower, effortless forms of 
engagement  often referred to as clicktivism (Morozov, 2012) but which might also 
act as a pathway to greater engagement with civic society (Gil de Zuniga et al, 
2010). The key, it seems, for political campaigners is to use these changing political 
participation repertoires to their advantage, and moreover, to meld the old and new 
forms of participation by facilitating clicktivists to engage with parties and their 
campaign in offline settings too.   
In the UK at least, NGOs have led the way in harnessing the low-threshold forms of 
activism that social media offers, but we are seeing political parties campaign and 
communicate increasingly like NGOs. A small but important aspect of this is 
extending a campaign’s reach by making everything shareable. Through network 
effects, the act of sharing via social networks can act as a powerful endorsement 
and increase the number of people who might see communication from the 
campaign, often through accidental exposure. Content that is liked or shared also 
gives the campaign access to user data – an increasingly valuable commodity in 
contemporary campaigns (Anstead, 2015). Therefore, while there are normative 
debates on whether liking or sharing is simple and meaningless clicktivism or 
evidence of a deeper engagement (Morozov, 2012; Lilleker, 2015), ether way the 
actions are useful for the organisation whose content is clicked. 
Mobilizing through email and social media 
The 2015 contest witnessed a continuation of the move towards harnessing the 
power of social networks to mobilize existing supporters and draw in new ones. Party 
websites largely conformed to a template of a splash screen encouraging visitors to 
sign up and leave data on their interests, as well as donating to or joining the party, 
backed up by a range of manifesto style pages outlining policy and personnel 
(Ridge-Newman & Mitchell, 2016). Beyond party websites, one innovation – led by 
the Conservatives – was to introduce gamification into the campaign. In recent years 
gamification has been led by the commercial sector where aspects of gaming - 
including micro rewards – are applied to motivate consumers to do the promotional 
work of the company. The Conservative Party tried to emulate this by operating a 
points scheme, Share the Facts. Those who signed up got points when they shared 
posts, and when others clicked or commented on their posts. Every fortnight the top 
twenty point scorers on their leaderboard would win a prize (see Jackson, 2015). 
Such an initiative was designed to convert supporters into online active campaigners 
and to get the key campaign messages out through a credible source - everyday 
people - rather than solely through the central party machine. 
The same could be said for party attempts to communicate to supporters through 
email. While considered a mundane internet tool, email is deeply integrated into 
internal party mobilizing practices (see Nielsen, 2010) and remains a very important 
technology for external communication too. This is because it is a push medium: it is 
intrusive and hard to ignore. It is also easy to evaluate its success through the click-
through and other data it sends. Email addresses are therefore highly sought after by 
parties and getting hold of email addresses becomes part of the campaigning 
strategy itself. 
Comparing the party emails from 2015 to previous elections, we can see a change in 
both tone and function. In previous elections emails appeared much like an e-
newsletter: a general list of updates, information, persuasive messages and links; 
with few if any opportunities to get involved. In 2015, firstly, we saw emails 
personalized – addressed to the recipient by name throughout the email. Then 
secondly, emails were invariably action oriented. Like the emails of campaigning 
organizations such as Avaaz or 38 Degrees, each email would be social media 
enabled and have a simple message and call for action: watch a video (then share 
it), donate (then share), participate in campaigning, sign a petition (and share), 
indicate voting preferences (and share) or choose from a list of reasons why you are 
voting (and share). Party emails also adopted a range of persuasive techniques 
borrowed from the NGO sector to urge supporters to carry out their calls for action 
(see Jackson, 2015). 
Taking this email from the Labour party from the last week of the campaign (DATE) 
requesting supporters to donate as an example, we see two such persuasive tropes. 
Firstly, the use of a very precise fundraising figure, implying very clear costings, then 
the provision of a very short timeframe suggesting an urgency to act.  
If we don’t raise the final £39,161 for our Get Out the Vote effort by midnight tonight, 
we risk handing a last-minute victory to the Tories in the seats this election will be 
decided. 
Furthermore, social norms are then applied, by telling the reader that 7490 people 
have already donated in the last 48 hours. As Jackson (2015) suggests, this implies 
that the recipient will not be alone if they donate. Rather, they are following the lead 
of many others like them, and thus compliance is seen as something normal. The 
recipient is offered a range of “quick” donation buttons to press, ranging from £3 to 
£20. For the smaller parties in particular, crowdfunding through email and social 
media was a clear strategy, though it appeared Labour raised the most money 
through such means (Mason, 2015). 
There are two further observations to be made here. The first is how remarkably 
similar the party emails are to those of NGOs – using the same persuasive 
techniques, focusing on one call for action and making the barriers to participate as 
low as possible. And the second is how similar the party emails are to each other. 
We looked at 49 emails during the campaign from Labour (10), Conservatives (11), 
LibDems (10), UKIP (12) and the Greens (6); and there was a remarkable 
consistency throughout the cases. An explanation here comes from the software 
used by parties and campaign groups. As McKelvey and Piebiak (2014) document, 
the affordances of political campaign software are shaping campaigning behaviours 
towards what we see in 2015: increasingly data driven, personalized, targeted, and 
social media enabled.  
While targeted advertising and private communication via email are increasing in 
importance, social media is a space where parties can increase their reach as their 
supporters like and share content; therefore creating engaging and shareable 
content is important. As Table 1 demonstrates, all of the main parties were present 
on social media but there is diversity in the concentration of usage of the differing 
platforms across the parties. Labour may be accused of over-communicating with 
their followers on Facebook, by the same token the Liberal Democrats seemed to be 
using Twitter to an inordinately greater extent than their rivals. Arguably the question 
of resources, and the notion of normalization which suggests parties with higher 
levels of resources maintain a communication advantage across all media (Margolis 
& Resnick, 2000), does not play a significant explanatory role. One of the lower 
resourced parties, the Greens, produced a far greater number of videos over the 
course of the campaign. Similarly Plaid Cymru, who only field candidates in Wales, 
produced a higher number of tweets than any other party apart from the Liberal 
Democrats. Therefore it seems reasonable to suggest that the concentration on any 
particular platform is purely an artefact of strategy. 
Table 1: Party usage of social media platforms 
 FACEBOOK  
POSTS 
TWEETS VIDEOS 
CONSERVATIVE 183 1,730 42 
LABOUR 432 1,436 49 
LIB DEMS 107 4,841 101 
GREEN 217 901 113 
SNP 166 1,340 28 
UKIP 174 1,451 10 
PLAID CYMRU 274 2,070 43 
 
Most parties concentrated on using Facebook as a virtual news feed, combining text 
reports of policy launches with posters, videos and hyperlinks to news reports. 
Labour, in particular, concentrated on posters, producing 316 over the campaign 
ensuring the availability of content for supporters to engage with and share. The 
Conservatives were more circumspect perhaps, with a total of 96. All other parties 
produced around 50 posters apart from Plaid Cymru who also appeared keen to 
leverage the enthusiasm of their supporters to share their 202 posters (for full data 
on poster production see Campbell and Lee, 2015). The Green Party and Liberal 
Democrats focused more on videos, both attempting to articulate their policies 
through this medium as well as building – or in the case of the Liberal Democrats 
rebuilding – trust through appearing to be honest and transparent in their 
communication using leader-focused videos. 
A broader observation here is the sheer amount of content created by the parties 
during the campaign. A collective 343 Youtube videos and 1,285 posters (not even 
taking account of new visual formats like games, lists, gifs, vines, boos, and raw 
videos) is evidence of their increasing embrace of social, mobile and visual media 
platforms as a way of communicating key campaign messages. Whilst broadcasters 
still place limitations on the number of Party Election Broadcasts (PEBs), social 
media is like the new Wild West in comparison. But again, we would hesitate to 
consider media platforms as separate spheres. In a hybrid media system, old and 
new media co-exist, feeding off each other, with content often remediated as it 
passes through different platforms (see Chadwick, 2011). As Anstead argues (2015), 
“older formats, such as Party Election Broadcasts, find a second life online, while 
online phenomenon such as [the collecting of tweets or posts by a hashtag to 
promote a particular idea, Cleggmania in 2010 or Milifandom in 2015 for example], 
are elevated by television and newspaper coverage.” Political party posters are a 
now a mixture of big budget billboard images designed by agencies such as Saatchi 
and Saatchi, hastily assembled in-house rebuttals to opponents’ claims and semi-
amateur assemblages created in Photoshop. For parties, designing content that cuts 
through the clutter is increasingly hard and, on social media at least, the question is 
whether a significant proportion of the electorate were likely to participate in the 
sharing culture parties promoted. 
Visitor Participation 
Drawing on the data from our survey (Table 2) we find, as an overall percentage of 
the UK electorate, around 17% are willing to share or comment on political material 
via social media1. The numbers for actual and projected voting behaviour are 
consistent with other polls, and we find that while 32% engage in none of the forms 
of participation offered as options, a significant number participate in at least one 
activity which encompasses both the online and offline environments. Taking 
discussing politics as an indicator of political interest, rather than using knowledge 
tests or self-reported interest as a measure, we also find just over half have sufficient 
interest for political issues to be a topic of conversation. 
Table 2: Percentage of UK citizens who participate in some form of political 
behaviour 
                                                 
1 No question was asked about liking political content on social media given that we did not 
differentiate between partisan and non-partisan materials to keep the questionnaire to a 
reasonable length. Therefore the interpretation of politics could be fairly wide. 
 More worrying for parties is that their cumulative followers are no more than 10.1%. 
While this can mean that up to 6.5 million are potential followers, in reality the 
numbers are much lower. In the 2015 general election, the six major UK parties had 
a total of 1,799,689 followers on Facebook and 822,581 on Twitter (see Table 3 
below). Combined with the fact that just under 6% are members of a political party, 
the data suggests that the current reach of parties on social media remains low. 
Benkler (2006) has hypothesised, however, that the network effect is the level of a 
party’s support squared. He suggests that if all supporters like or share content and 
they have a network of up to 500 people, some of who may also like and share party 
political content then the reach is accelerated and is exponentially greater than the 
actual number of fans. Therefore, while we find the actual number of those who 
directly participate is low, if parties can achieve their goal of harnessing their 
supporters to extend their reach there is potential benefits from their use of social 
media. Little wonder, then, that the parties created so much online content that was 
designed to be shared through social networks.  
When we look at the breakdown of Facebook followers in 2015, the Conservatives 
and UKIP had significantly more than any other party (see Table 3). The Liberal 
Democrats had a low number considering they are a national party, with the Greens 
gaining twice as many followers. It is clear then, that social media popularity is not 
wholly reflective of vote share. The figures are also not linked to the levels of output 
on each platform. Despite producing more than twice the number of Facebook posts 
than their rivals, Labour did not appear to earn as significant a following as the more 
strategic and less communicative Conservatives. The pattern for Twitter appears the 
reverse with Labour tweeting less than other parties, yet attracting more followers. 
Table 3: Support levels and Interactions with Parties at the 2015 UK Election 
 FACEBOOK 
FANS 
FB 
INTERACTION 
TWITTER 
FOLLOWERS 
RETWEETS 
CONSERVATIVE 480,955 4,171,734 157,590 282,335 
LABOUR 304,875 8,600,334 215,578 443,841 
LIB DEMS 113,126 190,533 95,722 238,736 
GREEN 215,955 2,638,966 137,057 222,322 
SNP 203,883 1,171,707 94,088 350,405 
UKIP 462,672 6,668,586 103,744 354,653 
PLAID CYMRU 18,223 153,743 18,802 169,855 
 
A clue to understanding this apparent contradiction can be found by looking at social 
media interactions, which are more meaningful than looking at followers alone and 
will be more valued by the parties. Any interaction, whether a like, a share or 
retweet, or a comment, is likely to show in an individual’s news feed and so has a 
chance of being seen by their network (and thus their network’s network and so on); 
though we recognise that the Facebook algorithm can influence what users see and 
from whom among those they follow. On Facebook there a significant number of 
likes, shares and comments across party posts and significant numbers of retweets. 
While there are no clear correlations between the effort, number of posts, and 
interactions, Labour’s verbosity on Facebook seems to have paid off with the party 
earning twice as many interactions as their main rival the Conservatives. Yet UKIP, 
who only posted 174 times, including ‘only’ 54 posters and 10 videos, gained two-
thirds the number of interactions as Labour. Therefore for significantly less effort, but 
due to an active and committed following, UKIP were able to extend their reach in a 
more cost effective way.  
Interestingly, an analysis of election Google searches found that UKIP consistently 
generated more search queries than all the other parties and their leaders 
throughout the campaign (Trevisan and Reilly, 2015). This would appear to validate 
Farage’s post-election claims that the party was a social media force that had 
“suddenly [become] the party for the under 30s,” a group that is perhaps best 
reached online.  
The comparatively fewer social media interactions of other parties perhaps hints that 
their supporters were less committed.  This is particularly the case for the Liberal 
Democrats, who gained the lowest number of interactions beyond Plaid Cymru, 
whose follower numbers were significantly lower anyway. Labour, SNP and UKIP led 
a tighter field for the number of retweets. The Liberal Democrats demonstrate no 
advantage from their frequency in tweeting, though Plaid Cymru’s low but not 
insignificant number of retweets may suggest they gained some benefit from high 
usage.  Figures for YouTube are highly reliant on single videos and their shareability. 
In this respect only one party stood out in 2015. The Green Party boy band parody 
“Change the Tune” was the only one to genuinely go viral, being viewed by just short 
of 8 million people2 by the day of the election and breaking through into mainstream 
media attention.   
Two-step flows – the visitor as medium 
Our data shows that the parties gained varying numbers of total interactions. 
However, the important question is the extent to which they were unique interactions 
or whether they are part of a suite of activities performed by highly committed 
activists, who frequently like, share and comment, and effectively were harnessed to 
the campaign. The only social media data we can analyse for the extent of individual 
actions is from Facebook. Here we use the terminology from SoTrender which 
classifies those who interact on party profiles. Occasionals are users who interact 
only once, Likers only ‘like’ but do so more than once, Debaters only comment (an 
interesting category as these may be as likely to be trolls who post hostile remarks 
as party cheerleaders showing support), Writers not only comment but interact with 
other users, Activists perform all behaviours, liking, sharing and commenting and 
appear to be advocates for the party. 
The highest percentages of visitors fall into the categories of Occasionals, the 
Lurkers who interact very rarely, or Likers (who only like). However, the positive note 
here is that around 40% of supporters are serial likers who extend the reach of their 
respective parties. The number of Debaters (who comment only and may include 
trolls) may concern some parties, in particular the Liberal Democrats.  A previous 
study noted that the BNP MySpace page housed only negative graffiti, with people 
joining, typing a post such as ‘Fascist Scum’ then leaving (Jackson & Lilleker, 2009). 
While Debaters will include cheerleaders who post comments such as ‘Go Ed’ on a 
Labour post following a speech by leader Ed Miliband, they also are likely to include 
those who posted negative remarks on Liberal Democrat posts about reneging on 
the promise to scrap student tuition fees when the party entered into coalition in 
2010. Therefore graffiti-style negativity may prevail for some parties to which there 
are strong negative associations with some members of the online community. 
Writers (who comment or publish only) are a minority, and again may include trolls 
and appear to be highest for Liberal Democrats. Within social media these ‘writers’ 
may be highly influential due to being perceived as highly knowledgeable activists 
within their networks, therefore while a minority these individuals maybe highly 
important and have an impact on not only remediating party communication but also 
adding interpretation that leads to a broader shared understanding, positive or 
negative, within their network (Anstead and O’Loughlin, 2014) 
                                                 
2 Whilst the Youtube video itself garnered ‘only’ approximately 800,000 views by the day of 
the election, our figure of 7.9 million views contains those achieved via shares (source: the 
Green Party).  
Table 4: Facebook interactions, segmented as a percentage of those 
performing actions frequently 
  Occasionals Likers Debaters Writers Activists 
Conservative Party 35.66 39.80 19.55 3.47 1.53 
Green Party 42.50 41.91 11.23 3.09 1.27 
Labour Party 43.08 34.90 16.68 3.68 1.65 
Liberal Democrats 32.72 37.01 24.72 4.40 1.16 
Plaid Cymru 43.46 43.43 9.33 2.68 1.10 
Scottish National 
Party 
43.48 44.43 7.69 3.46 0.94 
UK Independence 
Party 
34.12 48.43 11.06 3.64 2.75 
 
For all parties the worrying statistic is that in most cases the percentage of those 
who are Activists (who like, share and comment and may be ambassadors) is under 
2%. The actual number of activists for the Conservatives is a low but a comparatively 
respectable 7,344 people, the Liberal Democrats, in contrast, had only 1,311 
activists. The overall percentages then mask a reality that while the overall numbers 
are reasonably equal, apart from the number of Debaters, in order to maximise reach 
you need a large number of overall followers in order to gain a large number of 
Activists. The highest levels of commitment were demonstrated by UKIP followers, 
who number 12,705 – almost double that of the Conservatives. Hence, when we 
consider this, we assume that in terms of accidental exposure Facebook users were 
most likely to see content from UKIP followed by the Conservatives and Labour and 
least likely to see content from the Liberal Democrats and smaller parties. However 
this hypothesis is largely dependent on the network one chooses. If a person has a 
tendency towards one party or ideological standpoint – the left for example – and 
has a large community who also tend to be more leftist, it is equally likely that person 
will see no posts from UKIP and the Conservatives and rather see only content they 
agree with which might be shared from the profiles of Labour, the Green party or 
SNP (see Sunstein, 2007). Therefore, while reach is a goal for parties, even on the 
digital high street parties may only be preaching to the converted (Norris, 2003). 
Election outcomes and online activism 
The caveats regarding networks consisting of the ideologically similar, and the power 
of the Facebook algorithm to filter content, may explain why from a user’s point of 
view, social media is in actuality an ideological bubble that is isolated from the real 
world. Content from a range of sources may be remediated but it may also be 
contextualized to fit an ideological position which is shared witin a network. By taking 
the number of followers each party has across Facebook and Twitter as an absolute 
percentage of the overall total number of followers, so assuming each follower is 
unique and that the total number represents those with a propensity to engage in 
partisan politics on social media – an admittedly imperfect but indicative procedure – 
we gain a sense of the share each party has online. As Figure 1 indicates, UKIP 
have the highest percentage following overall, followed by Labour, the 
Conservatives, the Green Party, SNP, and then the Liberal Democrats and Plaid 
Cymru. Taking the overall vote share nationally we see that while the Conservative 
and Labour parties are prominent their position was reversed, UKIP only gained 14% 
of the vote as opposed to over 30% of the online share of support and the Greens 
and SNP also saw an online bias that was not reflected in their vote share.  
Figure 1: Comparing online support share and vote share (%) 
 
While the measurement of online share has significant flaws and is for illustration 
only, the serious point this data makes is that independent of the levels of support 
online – which is an influential factor in the number of activists harnessed to the 
campaign and the chances of extending reach and gaining accidental exposure to 
communication – there appears to be no link to the eventual outcome of the election 
contest.   
While there might be no reason to expect any form of correlation between online 
activity, the levels of support earned and vote share, similar measures have been 
used when considering the effort expended in constituency campaigning (Denver et 
al, 2004; Fisher et al, 2011). Therefore the problem is not with seeking an effect but 
with the fact that the numbers of activists and the likelihood of reaching beyond 
those already committed remains slight.  
However, if we imagine public opinion as less the sum of individual opinions (Allport, 
1937) and more as something generated through social interaction, embedded in 
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social relationships (see Blumer, 1948); then there might be more that social media 
can tell us about election results (see Anstead and O’Loughlin, 2014). Here, Blumer 
(1948) claims that public opinion measurement should be hierarchical, because who 
holds an opinion does matter, as some voices are likely to have more influence on 
public debate than others. Such an approach is well suited to analysis of social 
media share of voice, and the extent that some writers and activists may be 
extremely influential among their followers or within bounded ideological networks. 
Thus it may be that whilst UKIP and Labour had more support in a quantitative sense 
online, Conservative online supporters were ultimately more influential.  
Patterns of participation 
Identifying the extent that any individual is highly influential is impossible, however 
one might expect those who are hyper-activists may have greater influence. 
Furthermore, examining whether online activities are part of a suite of participatory 
behaviours indicates the extent of the online environment being connected to, or 
indeed detached from, the real world of politics. Returning to the data from the 
survey firstly we find some highly uneven patterns of participation (Table 5).   
Table 5: Patterns of Participation – standard correlations 
  Petition DEMO Boycott Contact 
Reps 
Join 
party 
Follow 
party 
Follow 
NGO 
Share 
political 
content 
Political 
commen
t 
DEMO .221**                 
Boycott .352** .391**               
Contact 
Reps 
.334** .417** .340**             
Join 
party 
.204** .578** .354** .430**           
Follow 
party 
.258** .269** .260** .311** .283**         
Follow 
NGO 
.363** .245** .345** .328** .200** .424**       
Share 
political 
content 
.293** .266* .296** .278** .250** .445** .476**     
Political 
comment 
online 
.284** .216** .299** .251** .180** .443** .442** .615**   
Discuss 
Politics 
offline 
.294** .137** .281** .256** .164** .192** .260** .287** .291** 
** significant at <.001 
We find that those likely to participate in all behaviours are around 20-30% likely to 
participate in any other of the forms of participation offered as options. However, for 
those who join a party while the correlations are significant the relationship is lower 
when asking about whether they share or comment on content. The numbers who 
follow parties online and then share content and comment are significantly higher, 
but the numbers are not as high as for those who follow NGOs. Therefore it would 
appear that parties are not mobilising their supporters effectively and in particular are 
not encouraging their members to follow them online or be harnessed to the 
campaign. Those who do follow parties online are committed partisans, measured by 
the extent that they are repeat voters and there is a strong and significant correlation 
with voter loyalty (.804**) however it would appear many are casually connected 
online as opposed to connecting with the party in order to both receive information 
and support campaigns. Therefore parties may be failing to draw online supporters 
closer to the party and so nurture and harness their enthusiasm, so the online 
activity has little impact due to the low numbers who work as activists. 
A further reason for the disparity between being active online and vote share may be 
explained by the likelihood of respondents voting and their self-reported participation 
in other participatory acts (Table 6). Rather than asking about past voting behaviour 
we take the number of those who declare they are likely or very likely to vote, those 
who constitute the 87.1% shown in Table 2. 
Table 6: Political Participation and Likelihood of voting 
 
The curious finding from the survey data is that despite nearly 100% declaring that 
they are likely to vote there is little correlation between voting and performing any 
other form of activity. The reasons for this are that, firstly, the numbers participating 
in one or more other actions are few and spread across the range of activities 
offered. Secondly, though, we find that in actual fact the 32% who participated in no 
other forms of political participation were no less likely to vote than the small number 
who claimed they had performed all other actions. In fact it seems that the non-
participants are slightly more likely to vote than any other group including those who 
contact elected representatives or join parties. The underlying reasons may be a 
factor of the UK voting system and the fact that within the first past the post, winner-
takes-all system in the safe seats there are many wasted votes. However there may 
be a range of other reasons which might be explained by specific context and 
campaign factors, as well as attitudinal and sociological explanations. The fact 
remains, putting the causes to one side, that despite there being a group within the 
survey who might align with the activists we witness sharing content and 
commenting on party profiles this group appear to be one of the groups that is least 
likely to vote. 
Conclusions 
In UK elections the air war, employing mass media, remains dominant and this tends 
to be a feature of most European democracies (Lilleker et al, 2015). The ground war, 
involving doorstep canvassing and getting out the vote is a feature of the swing seats 
only, and in 2015 the Conservatives 40/40 strategy targeting specific seats where 
they felt they could win accelerated the trend towards an uneven election. This 
inequality of campaigning was replicated online with geo-political targeting of voters 
within the strategically important geographical areas.  
Social media therefore plays an intermediary function, somewhere between the 
mass media campaign which it remediates and a more grassroots style where 
people are empowered to be campaigners; hence there is hybridity on two levels, in 
terms of content and in terms of ownership. Social media is given significant priority 
due to potential reach that can be earned via supporters within a two-step flow model 
of communication. Parties all produce material that is engaging, in the form of videos 
and posters, and shareable; so there is a strategy which seeks message virality. The 
parties largely remain in a realm of Web 1.5, in terms of eschewing direct 
interactions, but they attempted to harness the affordances of Web 2.0, and use the 
social web dynamics to extend their reach. The challenge they have is that their 
number of activists is as low online as offline, on average 1-7,000 per party. 
Therefore, while they may be making content that has the potential to go viral, unless 
they have active supporters keen to promote that content they are largely preaching 
to the converted. However, accepting the notion of ideological clustering, preaching 
to the converted and so firming up and encouraging the support of activists may be 
the best parties can achieve. But even when parties do gain a high number of 
activists, as UKIP managed in 2015, and when this converts into a modicum of 
electoral success in gaining 14% of the popular vote, they remain a political 
irrelevance with a single seat and perhaps some highly demoralised activists. 
Yet online activists remian a distinct minority. Online and clicktivist forms of political 
participation are slightly more commonplace than the traditional acts of 
demonstrating or joining a party. It would appear that actually they are a component 
within a suite of participatory actions, though they are largely not driven by partisan 
affiliation. Hence parties still struggle to get their messages promoted. This negative 
observation might underplay the power of the like, however. While hardcore activists 
are fairly low, around 40% of each party’s online support base liked or shared 
content at least once and a further group of 30-40% were serial likers. These people 
may have been drawn to like content on one or a few specific policy areas, content 
of a specific type or offering a specific style of message. Hence further research is 
required to determine what kind of content earns more shares and likes. The 
numbers, however, do suggest that all parties, depending of course on the number 
of supporters they have on social media, are likely to earn some degree of accidental 
exposure, despite ideological clustering and the Facebook algorithm having some 
negative impact on them realising this potential. But, perhaps actually content is king 
on social media. Despite having a maximum of 357,000 online followers, and of them 
215,000 of whom on Facebook only 1.27 were activists, the Green Party managed to 
have a video go viral and earn 8 million views in a matter of a few days. The video 
was humorous, perhaps appealed to those who agreed that the male party leaders 
offered little that was distinct, and so had qualities that made it engaging and 
shareable.  
However, we should not suggest that there is a ‘net’ effect as a result. 8 million 
people may have seen the video, they may even have agreed with the message and 
subsequently added a further like that accelerated its reach around the online 
network. But, viewing the video did not translate into votes. The Green party 
appeared to have plateaued at around 1 million supporters, and although their 
support base held between the 2014 European Parliament elections and the 2015 
General Election their enhanced viewing figures did not deliver a vote dividend. 
Hence, while there may have been small numbers converted or saw their support 
firmed up sufficiently to motivate them to vote the numbers may have been very 
small and in the broader scheme of an election fairly insignificant. In some marginal 
seats a few votes may have been crucial, but given that voters in those seats were 
bombarded with tailored advertising, doorstep visits by local and national figures, 
and experienced all aspects of the campaign jamboree it would be difficult to 
attribute any vote to accidental exposure on social media. As with many other 
campaign tools it is likely no party would abandon social media in the fear that there 
was an effect, however the reality is that much social media campaigning may only 
reach those already converted and loyal supporters. 
But these conclusions focus purely on activities within the networks of political 
parties and not the broader social space which is created within social media 
environments. If we look beyond the immediate lens of what the parties are doing 
and look at social media as a space, we may find it to increasingly be the primary 
space for citizens to conduct everyday political talk. Through complex patterns of 
remediation and contextualization we might find alternative patterns of influence from 
which parties and media brands may be present through content but their messages 
are altered and alternative meanings are offered. If these are also manifested as 
ideological echo chambers then social media may play an increasingly important role 
in providing the fabric for political socialization, including voter education, 
deliberation, persuasion and opinion formation. These highly dynamic and complex 
processes occur beyond the realms of party profiles but through the sharing 
mechanisms and the ability to write comments may be playing an increasingly 
important role in shaping election outcomes, ones which are largely hidden within the 
personalized news feeds of the millions of users that log in and engage within 
something political. 
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